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RECENT CASES
AntitrustNON-PATENT TYING AGREEMENTS AS PER SE
VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT
The Times-Picayune Co. publishes the only morning newspaper in
New Orleans, the Times-Picayune, and one of the two evening papers,
the States. The only competitor is the evening Item. In 1935 the TimesPicayune Co. began using a unit contract for classified advertising whereby
advertisements for only one of the two Times-Picayune papers were not
accepted, advertisers being forced to put the identical insertion in both the
papers.' In 1950 this unit contract was extended to general advertising
(insertions by national manufacturers), but advertising by local merchants
was not affected.2 The Times-Picayune alone had almost as many readers
as the two evening papers combined,- but its sales of both general and
classified advertising lineage averaged only about 40% of the New Orleans
market. 4 The classified and general advertising of the evening States,
however, increased materially upon the introduction of the unit contracts
so that in combination the two papers had 75% of this market.5 The
United States filed a civil suit under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,6 claiming under § 1 that the Times-Picayune was using the unit contract to
extend its monopoly position in the morning to the evening market; and
under § 2 that the Times-Picayune Co. intended to monopolize the newspaper market in New Orleans by operating the States at a loss and by
refusing to sell advertising in just one of its papers. The district court
found the Sherman Act violated. 7 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
Measuring dominance in terms of the advertising lineage in the morning
Tinms-Picayune, the Court found that with only 40% of the total newspaper general and classified advertising in New Orleans, as against 33 1/3%
if the advertising were divided evenly, the defendant did not have a
1. National figures indicate that advertising brings in about two-thirds of total
revenues to a newspaper, divided among the three types of advertising as follows:
local-37% ; general-17%; classified-15%. Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daily
Newspaper Industry, 61 YALE L.J. 948, 977 (1952).
2. The Times-Picayune Publishing Co. claimed that the unit contracts were
necessary to reduce advertising costs to meet the competition of radio and television.
Instant case at 624.
3. Average daily circulation figures for 1950 were: Times-Picayue-188,402;
States-105,235; Itenw-114,660. Instant case at 599.
4. Instant case at 616 n.37, 618 n.39.
5. See note 4 supra.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946). Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. .. ."
7. United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.
La. 1952).
(125)
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"dominant" position in the market and hence did not fulfill one of the two
necessary requirements for an illegal per se tying agreement under the
Sherman Act.8 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594 (1953). 9
Tying agreements are means by which a superior position in marketability for one product is used to force restrictions on the buyer's use of the
product, or to compel the purchase of other goods which could easily be
obtained elsewhere.' 0 In 1918 the Supreme Court held that tying leases
required by United Shoe Machinery were not illegal under the Sherman
Act as the leases were made voluntarily and were within the lessor's
patent rights." Four years later the Court held the same leases banned
by § 3 of the Clayton Act, 12 emphasizing the "dominant" position of United
Shoe Machinery. 13 For a number of years prosecution of tying agreements by the Federal Trade Commission was discouraged by two unfavorable decisions,' 4 but in International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States,'8 leases requiring lessees of patented business machines to
use cards made by the lessor were held violative of the Clayton Act since
a "substantial" amount of commerce was affected by the restraint. Tying
agreements based on a patent also were attacked from another quarter by a
series of cases that denied relief for contributory infringement 16 of the
patent, this attack having the effect of invalidating the leases or under8. The Court also held that, aside from the tying agreement allegations, the
facts did not show a violation of § 1 as no unreasonable or harmful effects were
proved, of §2 as no intent to monopolize could be proved. The Court further
stated that the rationale of tying cases was vitiated, as both the tied and tying
product (advertising market) were the same.
9. Justices Black, Burton, Douglas, and Minton dissenting. Instant case at 628.
10. See Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952, 955 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776 (1945): ". . . a condition that the goods sold or leased
shall be used only with other goods of the seller or lessor, the purchaser or lessee
agreeing not to deal in such other goods of competitors, or . . . the leasing of
equipment on the condition that it shall be used only with the supplies of the lessor."
See Note, 48 COL. L. Rxv. 733 (1948).
11. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946).
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce . . . to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented
*.
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor . . . where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale . . . may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
13. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
14. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) (no unfair method of competition shown in complaint, and courts, not Federal Trade Commission, to decide basis
of unfair methods of competition) ; FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463
(1923) (leases of gasoline pumps restricting use to lessor's gasoline valid).
15. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
16. The 1952 revision of the Patent Laws, 66 STAT. 811, 35 U.S.C.A. § 271c
(Supp. 1952), defines a contributory infringer as one selling ". . . a component of
a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition . . . constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use ...
"
See note 20
infra.
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standings that the user of a patented product use only patentor's unpatented
goods with the product. 17 Later relief for infringement of the patent itself
was refused on unclean hands principles.18 These cases were based on the
general policy of not allowing the patent monopoly to be extended, and
were forerunners of the application to tying agreements of the antitrust
per se doctrine since the abuse itself was condemned, regardless of market
or other considerations. 19 . The indication of the Mercoid case 20 that such
patent abuses were a violation of the antitrust laws 21 was emphatically
reiterated by the International Salt case,2 2 which contained not only both
of the elements seen in earlier tying cases-"dominant" position and "substantial" volume of commerce-but also a clear cut case of patent abuse.
Holding that agreements requiring lessees of a patented salt-dispensing
machine to use only lessor's salt tablets were per se violations of the
Sherman Act, § 1 and the Clayton Act, § 3, the Court based its decision on
the postulate that

"

.

.

it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors

from any substantial market." 23 This posed the question whether the doctrine of per se violation by foreclosure pinned on tying agreements was
restricted to patent abuse cases only, or whether it would extend to other
antitrust suits24

The instant case goes beyond the facts of International Salt and sets
out a broad rule intended to cover all tying agreements under both the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, not simply those gained by a patent. This
particular concern for the Sherman Act, not seen in previous cases, arises
17. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) ;
See Eastman,
Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
Contributory Infringement and the Combination Patent, 48 MIcH. L. Rxv. 183 (1949).
18. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
19. See Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and
Patent Misuse, 50 CoL. L. Rav. 170, 184-195 (1950); Note, Patent Abuses and
Antitrust: The Per Se Rule, 64 HARv. L. Ray. 626 (1951). Schueller, supra, is an
excellent discussion of the growth of the per se doctrine, his thesis being that practices related to common law forestalling are the subject of the per se rules.
20. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). Concerning the possible attempt of Congress to overcome this decision, see Note, Contributory Infringement and Misuse-The Effect of Section 271 of-the Patent Act of
1952, 66 Hagv. L. REv. 909 (1953).
21. ". . . the Court would be placing its imprimatur on a scheme which involves
a misuse of the patent privilege and a violation of the anti-trust laws." Mercoid
Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944).
22. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
23. Id. at 396. The Court's authority for this statement is Fashion Originators
Guild of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), in which Judge Learned Hand said: "It is also unlawful to exclude from
the market any of those who supply it . . . and it is no excuse for doing so that
their exclusion will result in benefits to consumers, or to the producers who remain."
It is interesting to note that none of the cases cited for authority support this statement, with the possible exception of Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904),
the others discussing exclusion in terms of unreasonable restraint.
24. See Notes, 49 COL. L. REv. 241, 244-245 (1949), 48 COL. L. REv. 733, 743
(1948) ; 57 YALE L.J. 1298, 1302 (1948). For cases applying criteria of foreclosure
in other situations, see United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-107 (1948);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 229 (1947). For detailed treatment see Schueller,
supra note 19, at 173, 195-198.
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25
because the prosecution of the instant case is based solely on that Act.
From earlier cases the Court culls its two major criteria: "monopolistic"
or "dominant" position in the tying product, and "substantial" volume of
commerce affected in the tied product. If either of the two exists, an
agreement is said to violate the Clayton Act; if both exist, the agreement
26
Though a tying agreement may
is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
be illegal for one of three reasonsy2 the focus here is on per se violations
because of the advantages in proving particular conduct illegal. Instead
of evidence on motive, intent, and effect to demonstrate unreasonableness,
28
all that need be shown is that a forbidden means was used, and illegality
29
This ease of proof, especially under the broader
will automatically follow.
in the incommerce coverage of the Sherman Act, has special significance
30
creasingly important realm of private treble damage suits.
The immediate query is how far the Court will carry the per se doctrine
in Sherman Act tying cases. Although the instant case advances the doctrine by substituting "dominant" position for patent monopoly, the interpretation of the word "dominant" will, as in the present case, probably
rely on "foreclosure" as defined by the patent cases. This may be seen
both historically, and in considerations of preserving competition. Although "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition," 31 and accomplish this by extending legitimate control

25. The United States abandoned the Clayton Act as there was an informal
Federal Trade Commission opinion to the effect that advertising space was not a
"commodity" within the terms of § 3. The Court expressed ". . . no views on that
statutory interpretation." Instant case at 609 n.27. Cf. Fleetway, Inc. v. Public
Service Interstate Transportation Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1934) (transportation
of passengers not a "commodity" within meaning of Clayton Act) ; United States
Investors Diversified Services, 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951) (money not a
v.
"commodity" within meaning of §3), 52 COL. L. REv. 1066 (1952).
26. "When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the 'tying'
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' product is restrained, a
tying arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton
Act because from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is
,inferred. . . . a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever
both conditions are met." Instant case at 608, 609. The historical dichotomy of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts is thus preserved. See Standard Oil Co. of California
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297, 311-314 (1949). It is doubtful that the dictum
on the Clayton Act represents a change in its interpretation. The rule is implicit in
§ 3 in the terms: ". . . substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce." Clayton Act, § 3, supra note 12.
27. (1) violation of the Clayton Act, §3; (2) violation of the Sherman Act,
§ 1 on the basis of an unreasonable restraint; (3) per se violation of the Sherman
Act, § 1.
28. A means may be forbidden either because bad in itself, as extension of a
patent monopoly, or because used to obtain an illegal result, as foreclosing from a
market. See Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d
Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
29. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (summary
judgment affirmed). See Schueller, supra note 19, at 173.
30. See Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developnents in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952). Concerning the
broader commerce coverage of the Sherman Act, see id. at 1015.
31. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
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in one market to another, the effectiveness of such control depends on the
market position of the tying product. If based on a patent, or on a
"dominant" position, the power to exclude is unlimited, but if based on less
the lever is greatly weakened and that which is most obnoxious-foreclosure-is minimized. Also, should the requirement of "dominance" be
relaxed greatly, the emphasis will shift from the present postulate of foreclosure being illegal per se to tying agreements being illegal per se, for
which there is as yet no precedent, and which, in the case of tying agreements known as requirements contracts, 82 may produce undesirable results.3 3 For these reasons, the rationale of the Court in the present case
in requiring "dominance" seems correct,3 4 but its factual application is
dubious.
It is, first of all, unrealistic to discuss the present market in terms of
advertising space rather than in terms of reader circulation. Advertising,
unlike the usual commodities, is of economic value only in relation to the
scope of its circulation. 85 But even if this aspect of the decision were correct, the Times-Picayune has a "dominant" position in any market that
can be drawn in New Orleans, which, in view of Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States,3 6 would seem to be at least the outer limits of the relevant
market. If the market is limited narrowly, as has been done in prior
cases,3 7 it would be based on the morning market in which the TimesPicayune, the only morning paper, undoubtedly has a monopoly position. 8
The unit contracts would not have been effective without this morning
monopoly position, for then it would not have been necessary to deal with
the Times-Picayune to cover the entire reader market. Furthermore, if
the market is broadened to include the entire New Orleans newspaper industry, the "dominant" position of the Times-Picayune is nevertheless
inescapable. Although the Times-Picayune itself directly controlled only
40%6 of the New Orleans advertising market, its control of the evening
States, which covered an additional 35%o, gave it in effect a 757o control
32. An agreement whereby the seller agrees to furnish, and the buyer to purchase, all his requirements of a commodity or commodities from the seller.
33. For discussion on different economic effects and justifications of tying agreements and requirements contracts, see Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-314 (1949); Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 241 (1949). These
considerations, along with the traditionally different approach to the two acts, may
have influenced the Court in setting out differing standards for them, for though
the Court has felt required to condemn requirements contracts under the Clayton
Act, it has done so in spite of a conviction that there was considerable justification
for their existence. This dilemma is avoided here, if only for Sherman Act prosecutions based on its broader commerce and non-commodity coverage, unless the contract is based on a "dominant" position.
34. To combat tying agreements where less than a "dominant" position exists,
the unreasonable restraint precepts can still be applied.
35. The Court seemed to recognize this factor at one place. See instant case
at 613.
36. 342 U.S. 143 (1951). The market was confined to the town in which the
paper was published. Id. at 154.
37. See Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building, Inc., 194 F.2d
484 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952), 101 U. oF PA. L. REv. 550 (1953).
38. This was the dissenting Justices' opinion. Instant case at 628.
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of the market. If such market control does not constitute a "dominant"
position, the term becomes meaningless.8 9 The Court, however, seemed
simply unwilling to interfere with the newspaper industry at this time because of the widespread repercussion on this industry's already precarious
financial position of a decision outlawing unit contracts. 40 But the Court's
handling of "dominance" is to be regretted in view of the possibility of its
extension to future non-newspaper tying cases in which courts will have no
comparable justification for a similar delimitation of the market.

Conflicts of LawAPPLICATION OF FOREIGN STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS NOT REQUIRED BY
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
The plaintiff's intestate, a resident of Alabama, was killed in Alabama
by a bursting emery wheel, manufactured by the defendant, a Pennsylvania
corporation. Finding it impossible to serve process on the defendant in
Alabama, the plaintiff brought an action under the Alabama wrongful death
statute in the federal district court in Pennsylvania. The action was
brought more than one year, but less than two years after the accident
occurred. The district court dismissed the suit,' holding that it was bound
by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations of one year, although the limitation incorporated in the Alabama wrongful death act was two years.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding, holding that the
Pennsylvania conflict of laws rule, which directs its courts to apply the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations, rather than that of Alabama, did not
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.2 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,

345 U.S. 514 (1953).
Traditionally statutes of limitation have been regarded as procedural
rather than substantive and under the well known principle of conflicts
39. Even in the patent cases complete control of the market was not always
obtained. Thus, in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947),
International Salt was not the only manufacturer of the machine the tying agreements
were based on. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
305 (1949).
40. The Court discusses the problems of the newspaper industry for several
pages, and notes that 180 other publishers of morning-evening newspapers use the
unit contract plan. Instant case at 602-604. See Comment, Local Monopoly in the
Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 YALE L.J. 948, 1007 (1952). "Drastic attempts to
reverse economic trends and restructure the industry should await further scientific
exploration of the impact of local press monopoly on democratic processes in the
community." Query if the same decision would have been reached if the TimesPicayune had forced advertisers to agree not to advertise in the States, which would
be equivalent to the type of restriction in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, supra
note 36.
1. 102 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
2. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State."

U.S. CoNsT. ART. IV, § 1.
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law,8 entirely within the control of the forum.4 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held that a state was free to apply its own statute of limitations to
causes of action arising in foreign jurisdictions. 5 This doctrine has been
accepted as a general rule, but a conflict of authority has developed concerning statutes which, like Alabama's in the instant case, incorporated a
time limitation in the same act which established the cause of action. 6
There is considerable authority holding that such limitations are inseparable
from the rights created-that they are part of the substantive right of
the plaintiff.7 Many courts have held, in such circumstances, that the case
could be heard in the forum's courts (or in the federal courts of the forum
state) even though the forum's statute of limitations had run. 8 In the
instant case the Court has, for the first time, tested the constitutionality
of a state conflict of laws rule which compels the application of the forum
statute of limitations despite the fact that a longer limitation is incorporated
in the foreign act under which the claim arose. In upholding its constitutionality under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court has chosen
to ignore the distinction between general statutes of limitation and limitations incorporated in statutes creating specific causes of action 9 and apparently has reversed a trend toward invalidating state exclusionary rules
based on unsubstantial local policy. 10
3. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (3d ed. 1949). Matters of procedure are
governed by the internal law of the forum no matter where the transaction occurred
out of which the claim now in litigation arose. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) the Supreme Court held that the federal district
courts must accept the conflict of laws rule of the state in which they sit.
4. This theory developed in the English courts, which, being relatively unfamiliar
with foreign law, were inclined to restrict its application as much as possible.
American courts adopted the English reasoning even though there is little justification for it in this country where judges encounter no difficulty in interpreting
the laws of neighboring states. See Blume and George, Limitations and the Federal
Courts, 49 Mica. L. Rav. 937 (1951).
5. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 (U.S. 1839).
6. GOODIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 86 (3d ed. 1949); 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF
LAWs § 540b (3d ed., Parmele, 1905).
7. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199
(1886); Lewis v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 177 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Sea Grove Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stockton, 148 Pa. 146, 23 Atl. 1063 (1892);
Parker v. Flies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, 10 So.2d 13 (1942).
8. Theorux v. Northern Pacific Ry., 64 Fed. 84 (8th Cir. 1894); Keep v.
National Tube Co., 154 Fed. 121 (C.C-D.N.J. 1907); Calvin v. West Coast Power
Co., 44 F. Supp. 783 (D. Ore. 1942); Coffman v. Wood, 5 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill.
1934); Negaubauer v. Great Northern Ry., 92 Minn. 184, 99 N.W. 620 (1904).
Contra: Cauley v. S. E. Massengill Co., 35 F. Supp. 371 (D. Tenn. 1940) ; Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930); Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302
Pa. 279, 153 AtI. 346 (1931).
9. The Court calls this distinction "too unsubstantial to form the basis for
constitutional distinctions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." Instant case
at 518.
10. The Court recently held that a state cannot refuse to entertain actions based
on foreign wrongful death acts while permitting its own citizens to bring such
actions under its own laws. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). Moreover, a
state law which excludes only those foreign claims which could have been litigated
in some other jurisdiction has been held invalid. First National Bank of Chicago
v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1951).
For a dicsussion of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause prior to these decisions see R. H. Jackson, Full Faith, and Credit,
the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COL. L. REv. 1 (1945).
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The doctrine that each state should be free to impose its own statute
of limitations is supported by the argument that a statute of limitations
defines the maximum period during which, in the estimation of the legislature, an action may be brought without unduly increasing the chances of
a miscarriage of justice due to ill-remembered testimony and forgotten
records."
It was originally feared that imposition upon the forum of
cases "older" than those permitted by the forum's statute would weaken
the forum's judicial system.' 2 The force of this argument indicates that
an extreme application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause-imposing the
statute of the foreign state upon the forum in all cases-would be unjustified, for under such a rule the forum would be unable to protect itself
against "old" cases arising in jurisdictions having long general statutes of
limitation. On the other hand, modern approaches to conflict of laws
theory have given rise to strong policy arguments favoring litigants whose
rights are cut off by short limitation periods of the forum state.' 3 When
the holder of a right can avail himself of it only in the place where the
tort feasor is to be found and the statute of limitations in that state has
already run-it is meaningless to say that the right still exists. Thus a
deserving plaintiff's remedy can be destroyed merely to protect the court
of the forum from hearing testimony that has aged slightly longer than
the rules of the forum permit. These considerations are especially applicable to cases arising under the wrongful death acts. Since practically
all of these acts require that suit be brought within a specified period,
the usual limitation being one or two years,' 4 there is practically no
chance that a state's courts could be subjected to extremely old cases.
However, there is constant danger that a plaintiff will be denied recovery
should he fail to bring his action within a time limit set by the defendant's
home state. Moreover, the foreign legislature, by so closely incorporating
the right and the limitation may be said to have specially considered
their interrelationship, which would certainly not be the case with a gen11. For an analysis of these theories see McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 933 (1930);
Comment, 28 YALE L.J. 492 (1919).
12. "There can be no pretense to say, that foreigners are entitled to crowd the
tribunals of any nation with suits of their own, which are stale and antiquated, to
the exclusion of the common administration of justice between its own subjects."
STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 578 (Redfield's ed. 1865).
13. Justice Cardozo expressed this modern approach as "a growing conviction
that only exceptional circumstances should lead one of the states to refuse to enforce
a right acquired in another. . . . They [the courts] do not close their doors unless
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the commonweal." Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 113, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
14. Wrongful death acts which incorporate a one year statute of limitations include: CONN. Rxv. GEN. STAT. § 8296 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 70, § 2 (SmithHurd 1936); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1603 (Purdon 1855). Those having a two
year limit include: FLA. STAT. ANN. c. 95, §95.11 (6) (1941); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 573.02 (1945); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 31-3 (1952); N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW § 130.
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eral statute of limitations. The advantages of permitting the state to apply
its own statute of limitations are thereby outweighed by the potential
harm which might result.
The further contention, expressed in the dissent to the instant case,' 5
that the decision would enable shopping for favorable forums, appears to
be unjustified. Many courts hold that after the statute of the lex delicti
has run the right is gone, the limitation having accompanied the obligation everywhere.' 0 It seems doubtful that the present decision could force
these courts to change their views; holding that states can apply their
own limitation to bar actions based on longer foreign statutes is not tantamount to holding that the forum must apply its own statute when the
foreign statute is shorter. In addition, many states have "borrowing" statutes which permit a defendant to plead any "bar" to the action which exists
in the state where it accrued, even though such a bar does not exist in the
forum state.17 Among the "bars" which are thus made effective is the
statute of limitations of the foreign state.' 8
A comprehensive rule designed to achieve a proper balance of interests in this area of the law is difficult to formulate. The theoretical ideal
would be to apply the statute of limitations of the forum only to the extent
necessary to protect its judicial process against the danger of partially
forgotten testimony, but such a rule would be almost impossible to apply
and would offer no guide to the district courts when faced with conflicting
state statutes. The most practical reconciliation could be achieved by
adopting the view rejected inthe instant case: that of applying the foreign
statute of limitations whenever that limitation is incorporated in the act
which creates the right. This view, a compromise between the two extreme
positions, is supported by precedent ' 9 and would permit many deserving
plaintiffs to prosecute their actions in states where service can be obtained
while still protecting those states from the imposition of cases arising in
jurisdictions having long general statutes of limitation or no limiting statutes
whatsoever.
15. Instant case at 519 (Justice Jackson).
16. Davis v. Mills, supra; The Harrisburg, supra; Ford, Bacon & Davis v.
Volentine, 64 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1933); Dunn Const. Co. v. Bourne, 172 Miss.
620, 159 So. 841 (1935) ; Wingert v. Carpenter, 101 Mich. 395, 59 N.W. 662 (1894).
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 605 (1934)

and GOODRICH,

CONFLICT OF LAws

§ 86 (3d ed. 1949) both accept this principle.

17. For a compilation and discussion of these statutes see 75 A.L.R. 203.
18. E.g., N.Y. CIv. PRac. ACT § 13. 'Where a cause of action arises outside
of this state, an action cannot be brought in a court of this state to enforce such
cause of action after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of a state or
country where the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon such cause
of action, except where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a resident
of this state.' See Legis., Legislation Governing the Applicability of Foreign
Statutes of Limitation, 35 COL. L. REv. 762 (1935). Statutes with provisions similar
to New York's are listed at 764 n.14 of this article.
19. See note 8 supra.
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Constitutional LawVENDOR MAY DEFEND DAMAGE ACTION
FOR BREACH OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
BY RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF NON-CAUCASIAN VENDEES
Defendant breached a restrictive covenant by selling land to a nonCaucasian, and the co-covenantors sued for damages. Defendant demurred
on the theory that a court award of damages would be state action and a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The demurrer was sustained by the county court in California, and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that defendant had standing to raise the question and upholding his contentions. Defendant was
allowed to raise injury to a third party, non-Caucasians, as a defense,
because she was the only person capable of objecting for them. The Court
reasoned that enforcement of the covenant would result in discrimination
against non-Caucasians through higher prices to them induced by vendors'
fear of contract actions.1 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
Under the usual rules of standing, an individual may not raise the
constitutional rights of others, since the deprivation of their rights constitutes no injury to his own. 2 However, this rule has been relaxed where
the objector has sustained a "direct" injury to his rights or property as
3
the result of the operation of an unconstitutional statute on another.
4
Thus in Buchanan v. Warley, in a suit for specific performance of a land
contract, the plaintiff, a white vendor, was permitted to question the constitutionality of an ordinance which prohibited Negroes from living in that
area because it prevented his conveyance.
The instant case differs in that the state action, the award of damages
for violation of a simple contract, affects first the defendant, and fails
to change his contract rights. Furthermore, the unconstitutional injury
to non-Caucasians would then follow only as the future effect of the award
on the real estate market. Under such circumstances no non-Caucasian
can now object, not only because none are parties to the contract, but also
because none can yet show a personal injury.5 The Court, therefore, has
1. Enforcement here would also lead to the insertion of liquidated damage
clauses in the covenants and further discourage their breach.
2. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S.
571, 576 (1915); RorrSCHAmEFER, CONSTITUTIOxAL LAW 27-28 (1939).
3. E.g., held direct: Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S.
407 (1942) (parent network injured by federal regulation of subsidiary stations);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (excluded schools injured by state
law forbidding parents to privately educate their children); held indirect: PUC v.
Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 246 (1918) (company transporting and selling gas interstate
not injured by regulation of the rates chargeable by local companies); Row,ScHAEFFER, COxSTTUTIONAL LAW 28-29. See Note, 35 ILL. L. REv. 983 (1941).
4. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
5. Tyler v. Judges, 179 U.S. 405 (1900). The injury in Barrows has not yet
occurred, nor has it affected any one person. Cf. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 162 (1914) (Five Negroes sued to enjoin the defendant railroad
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allowed defendant to raise the rights of those who would have no standing themselves. In attempting to find precedent for allowing defendant
to raise the rights of third parties in this situation, the Court cites United
States v. Railroad Co.,0 where the court, without discussion, allowed defendant to object that a federal tax deducted from interest payments made
by it placed an unconstitutional burden on the municipality and thereby on
the state. However, this case is distinguishable on grounds of injury
to the defendant railroad, since the tax changed the railroad's contract obligations and made future financing more expensive. 7
The basis for the present holding appears to be twofold. First, under
the facts of the case, it would be virtually impossible for a non-Caucasian
ever to raise the issue.8 He would have no standing in the breach of
covenant proceeding, nor could he challenge the actual discrimination in
the future, since higher prices in themselves would not be state action. In
allowing standing based on necessity, the Court resorted to a doctrine used
for many years in some state courts, 9 but never before voiced in the Supreme Court. Second, the Court was reluctant to sanction an action by a
state court which would tend to enhance the legal position of restrictive
covenants. The principle initiated in Shelley v. Kraemer 10 whereby court
action is held to be state action under the Fourteenth Amendment would,
from making any distinction in its service under a state statute providing for equal,
but separate accommodations for Negroes. The Court held that they had no right
to relief since none could show that he had been refused service.).
6. 17 Wall. 322 (U.S. 1872).
7. Accord, Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (State employee
granted standing to object to the federal income tax). This case is distinguishable
on the basis of creating a new obligation for the employee which increased the
state's labor costs. The other cases cited in support of the holding in the instant
case are similar to Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
8. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 14 and a few state codes it might be possible to introduce the non-Caucasian in person if an indemnity clause were inserted in the
contract of sale.

See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 410-19 (2d ed. 1947).

Unfortunately,

third-party defendants are generally limited in raising defenses against the original
plaintiff to those defenses which the original defendant has. Although contracts
indemnifying a breach of contract, here the restrictive covenant, are generally unenforceable, the one suggested here might be held enforceable by analogy to the
doctrine that contracts indemnifying a tortious act are enforceable where the parties
in good faith believed the act to be lawful. See 6 CoRBiN, CoNTRAcrs 861, 863
(1951). However, the possibility of a non-Caucasian gaining standing on this ground
is so remote that the doctrine of necessity can be properly applied here.
9. E.g., Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac.
1021 (1920); Greene v. State, 83 Neb. 84, 119 N.W. 6 (1908); State v. Shady,
100 Vt. 193, 136 At. 26 (1927). The doctrine has been applied most frequently
by state courts in situations where a statute denied jurisdiction of the state courts
to a class, or where it declared that a designated act was a crime only when committed against persons other than members of the class. In neither case would the
class ever have access to the state courts to object. Miller v. Lamar Life Ins. Co.,
158 Miss. 753, 131 So. 282 (1930), where a statute granted a tax exemption to
resident insurance companies, is comparable to the instant case. The court there
held that a tax collector could raise the rights of non-resident insurance companies.
Since invalidation of the statute would not change the companies' present legal
position, they would never themselves have standing to object. The instant decision
does not extend the doctrine of necessity because the impossibilty required by state
decisions of a class standing on its own is present.
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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under a contrary holding, be incomplete and easily evaded." A remedy
in damages would have been substituted for the injunction held unconstitutional in Shelley.
Certain of the policies which justify rules of standing seem to be
ignored by the instant holding. It tends to upset the equality of the legislative branch of government by resolving problems where the injured
parties are not before the decision-making body.' 2 Furthermore, allowing persons to raise the rights of others causes a commensurate increase in
the practical burden of litigation in the Court. Nevertheless the holding
is certainly justifiable because full advocacy is assured and the alternative
would be to allow state action resulting in discrimination to go forever
unchallenged. Since a primary purpose of the decision was to supplement
Shelley, it may be that Barrows will be limited to its facts, but the adoption
of the necessity doctrine may provide a means of extension to cases other
than those involving racial discrimination.

Criminal LawCOTENANT LIABLE FOR
MISAPPROPRIATION OF COTENANCY PROPERTY
Defendant and three others entered into a "Cotenancy Agreement"
for the acquisition and operation of certain petroleum and gas properties.
Under the agreement each party was to have a one-fourth interest as tenant
in common, and defendant was to "manage, control and operate said property with as full and ample authority and unrestricted power as if he were
the sole owner thereof," for which he was to receive a stipulated salary.
It was further provided that he was to receive, "as agent," all oil produced,
sell it at his discretion, pay all obligations, and remit to the cotenants their
proportionate share of the profits. While obligations of $300,000 remained
unpaid, defendant withdrew from the business without authorization
$235,000 which he placed in his personal bank account. Defendant was
convicted for fraudulent conversion and embezzlement under statutes which
require that the property taken be that of "any other person."' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the convictions, notwithstanding
defendant's status as cotenant, on the grounds that the property was divisible in character and that defendant came into possession of the funds
as agent rather than as co-owner. Commonwealth v. Bovaird, 373 Pa. 47,
95 A.2d 173 (1953).
11. See Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate-Property Values v. Human
Values. 24 NoTRE DAmE LAW ymR 157, 182-189 (1949).
12. See 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImiTATIoNs 332-335 (8th ed., Carrington,
1927).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

18, §§ 4834, 4824 (Purdon 1945).
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In the absence of a statutory provision making part ownership no
defense to theft,2 it has been almost universally held that a partner or
other co-owner is not criminally responsible for larceny or embezzlement
of property in which he has an ownership interest.3 This doctrine is
based on the common law rule that "the interest or ownership of [a]
partner extends to every portion of [the partnership's] property..
Each partner combines in himself at once the character of principal and
agent, and may possess and dispose of the firm's funds and property,
even to the extent of appropriating them to his own use, by withdrawing
them from the common fund." 4 It has been similarly rationalized on
the basis of statutes which require that the property taken must be that
of "another"." Though seemingly sound insofar as it is a logical application of well established concepts of ownership, this doctrine has left a
serious gap in the development of modern penal enforcement: partners,
cotenants, commission agents," spouses, 7 and others 8 who could validly
claim an ownership interest in misappropriated property have been immune
from prosecution. The courts, therefore, have avoided the doctrine where
possible: commission agents were excluded from the rule when they misappropriated more than the amount to which they were entitled; 9 the
rule was found inapplicable where a partnership was executory 10 or had
been dissolved; : and members of unincorporated associations have often
been excluded from the defense. 12 Moreover, many jurisdictions have
drafted statutes to specifically remove partial ownership as a defense.' 3
The court in the instant case refused to be blinded by the conceptual
implications of joint ownership. Since the defendant under the cotenancy
agreement had some duties of, and was designated as, an agent, and as such
2. See note 13 infra.
3. E.g., State v. Kent, 22 Minn. 41 (1875) ; State v. Reddick, 2 S.D. 124, 48
N.W. 846 (1891) ; 2 WHARTON, CRIMrAL LAW §§ 1162, 1264, 1282 (12th ed. 19323.
For an extension of this doctrine to forgery, see State v. Whitson, 159 Tenn. 401, 19
S.W.2d 244 (1929).
4. State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309, 315, 99 Pac. 954, 957 (1909). See also 2
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw §1264; 1 HALE P.C. 513 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
5. E.g., State v. Elsbury, 63 Nev. 463, 175 P.2d 430 (1946) ; Note, 169 A.L.R.
364 (1947); 32 MINN. L. REv. 68 (1947).
6. McElroy v. People, 202 Ill. 473, 66 N.E. 1058 (1903).
7. Lamphier v. State, 70 Ind. 317 (1880).
8. State v. Kent, 22 Minn. 41 (1875) (collector of pew rents on percentage commission) ; Commonwealth v. Stearns, 43 Mass. (2 Metc.) 343 (1841) (auctioneer);
Van Etten v. State, 24 Neb. 734, 40 N.W. 289 (1888) (attorney).
9. United States v. U.S. Brokerage & Trading Co., 262 Fed. 459 (D.C.
S.D.N.Y. 1919); State v. McNamara, 128 Conn. 273, 22 A.2d 10 (1941).
10. Napoleon v. State, 3 Tex. App. 522 (1878) ; State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309,
99 Pac. 954 (1909).
11. See Sharpe v. Johnston, 59 Mo. 557, 577 (1875).
12. People v. Foss, 7 Cal.2d 669, 62 P.2d 372 (1936) (non-profit enterprise);
People v. Herbert, 162 Misc. 817, 295 N.Y. Supp. 251 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (labor union).
13. State v. MacGregor, 202 Minn. 579, 279 N.W. 372 (1938) (utilizing MINN.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 622.02 [West 1945]) ; Wis. STAT. § 343.20(2) (1951) ; English

Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 GEo. 5, c. 50, §40(4).
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).

See

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 206.1(4)

138

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

would fall within the purview of the embezzlement and fraudulent conversion statutes, 14 the court was afforded a doctrinal hinge with which to
circumvent the entrenched joint ownership rule.15 As indicated by the
court, the funds were divisible and defendant's interest therein was merely
fractional; 16 he could be said to have no property in that portion representing the interests of the other cotenants. 17 While it may be argued that
the instant felony convictions are unjustified in the absence of express
statutory sanction,' 8 especially in light of a Pennsylvania statute making
fraudulent conversion by a partner only a misdemeanor, 19 the Pennsylvania
court was faced with a factual situation that demanded a further erosion
of the partial ownership defense. The purpose of all larceny statutes is to
deter the wrongful deprivation of property which exists no less in the joint
ownership than other theft situations. 20 Thus, aside from possible psychological differences involved in misappropriating property which one
owns in part rather than that wholly of strangers, it would seem that the
acts bespeak equal condemnation and equal punishment. The instant decision, along with statutes aimed at eliminating the joint ownership defense, 2'
encompasses that conclusion.

Internal RevenueCOST OF TAX COURSE DEDUCTIBLE
AS A BUSINESS EXPENSE
The taxpayer, an attorney who was the federal tax expert in his firm,
deducted from his federal income tax as an ordinary and necessary business expense the cost of attending a course on federal taxation offered for
accountaits and attorneys already competent in the field., Included were
14. See note 1 supra.
15. Cf. State v. Kusnick, 45 Ohio 535, 15 N.E. 481 (1888); State v. Sasso,
20 N.J. Super. 158, 89 A.2d 489 (Hudson County Court, Crim. Div., 1952).
16. Instant case at 56, 95 A.2d at 176.
17. See opinion by Learned Hand, J., in United States v. U.S. Brokerage &
Trading Co., 262 Fed. 459 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1919).
18. See the dissent by Justice Allen Stearne in the instant case.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4835 (Purdon 1945).
20. The Model Penal Code in rejecting the common law notion states: "At
common law, and still in some states, convictions are prevented by the conception
that each of joint owners has complete title to the jointly owned property, so that
he cannot misappropriate what already belongs to him. Whatever the merits of such
notions in the civil law, it is clear that they have no relevance to the criminal law's
effort to deter deprivations of other people's economic interests." MODEL PENAL
CODE, §206.1(4), comment A (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
21. See notes 13 and 19 supra.
1. The course in federal taxation "was not conducted for the benefit of those
unversed in the subject . . . and students were warned away. . . . It was 'designed by its sponsors to provide a place and atmosphere where practitioners could
gather trends, thinking and developments in the field of Federal taxation from experts accomplished in that field."' Coughlin v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 203
F.2d 307, 308 (2d Cir. 1953).
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the costs of tuition, travel, board and lodgings. The commissioner disallowed the deduction; the Tax Court affirmed his decision; 2 and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that it was
necessary for the taxpayer to take the course in order to maintain his
existing level of proficiency in the tax field. Coughlin v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).8
In computing net income for federal income tax purposes, ordinary
and necessary business expenses are deductible, 4 while personal expenses
are not.5 In 1921 the Bureau of Internal Revenue gave an indication of
its future attitude toward the deduction of education costs when it issued
two rulings which declared the expenses of doctors' graduate courses 6
and teachers' summer school courses 7 to be personal. The bureau's pronouncements went unchallenged for some time, for in the few subsequent
cases which involved education expenses the taxpayers' expenditures were
clearly personal.8 The first case posing a legitimate test of those rulings
was Hill v. Comn'r of Internal Revenue, 9 in which the taxpayer, a school
teacher faced with the necessity of renewing her teaching license, was required either to pass an examination on five selected books or to take
certain college courses. She elected the latter alternative and deducted the
ensuing expenses from her income tax. In affirming the commissioner's
action in disallowing the deduction, the Tax Court cited the Bureau's
ruling on teachers' summer school courses and pointed out that most
teachers fulfilled the requirement by being examined on five books. The
court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the cost of taking the courses
was a business expense, and formulated the first rationale for distinguishing between personal and business education costs. Where the course is
taken "to maintain .

.

.

[a] present position, not to attain a new position;

to preserve, not to expand or increase; to carry on, not to commence" 10
education costs are to be considered business expenses. The court, however, at the same time stated that their decision was limited to the facts
before them.'" Acordingly, where a lesser degree of necessity for the
2. George C. Coughlin, 18 T.C. 528 (1952).
3. The Solicitor General decided not to apply for certiorari in the instant case.
4 P-H 1953 FED. TAx Smnv. 1171,111 (1953).
4. "All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business . . ." shall be deductible from gross
income. INT. REv. CoDE § 23(a) (1) (A).
5. "In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of-(1) Personal, living, or family expenses ...
"
INT. REV. CODE
§ 24(a) (1).
6. O.D. 892, 4 CuM. BULL. 209 (1921).
7. O.D. 984, 5 CuM. BULL. 171 (1921).
8. George F. Lewis, 8 T.C. 770, aff'd per curiam, 164 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947)
(cost of son's law education) ; T.F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926) (cost of voice
lessons for wife's anticipated singing career).
9. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), reversing 13 T.C. 291 (1949).
10. Id. at 909.
11. Id. at 911.
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education of the taxpayer was found to exist, the expense was considered
personal by subsequent courts 12 until in the instant case it was held

sufficient that the taxpayer had merely a "moral duty to keep sharp the
tools" of his trade.
In contrast to the results in education expense cases under the Hill
rule, such non-education expenses, of questionable necessity, as the cost of
attending a business or professional convention,' 3 the cost of subscribing
to a technical journal, 14 the cost of a liquor dealer's purchasing entertainment tickets from customers,' 5 the cost of running a yacht upon which
customers were entertained, 1 and the cost of an attorney's belonging to a
social club 17 have been held to be deductible. Thus, even though the
present decision broadens the area within which education costs will be
considered business expenses, looking at the business expense field as a
whole, it is a decision not inconsistent with previous holdings. The effect
of the instant case in eliminating much of the dichotomy between the reasoning in education and non-education cases is to be commended, for it
seems inconsistent to allow a business or professional man to deduct the
expense of subscribing to a technical journal which he reads for the knowledge it will afford him and at the same time to disallow the expense of

acquiring that knowledge directly.
Most courses taken by professional men in connection with their businesses meet the requirement of the instant case in that there is as strong
a "moral duty" to gain the knowledge offered and thus they are in the nature
of a business expense.' 8 But the course in question in the instant case las
an attribute which may provide a point of distinction for future courts. Because of the frequent changes in the tax law, the education acquired is
12. E.g., Richard Henry Lampkin, 21 P-H 1952 TC MEm. DEC. 52,173 (1952)
(deduction by a college professor for the cost of research for his doctor's dissertation disallowed); Manoel Cardoza, 17 T.C. 3 (1951) (deduction by college professor for the cost of research in Europe disallowed) ; Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956
(1950) (deduction for cost of an engineer's attending engineering night school
course disallowed). But cf. Rhonda Fennell, P-H 1953 TC MEM. DEC. ff 53,156
(1953) (librarian allowed to deduct cost of summer school course, required for renewal of her license). I.T. 4044, 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 16, modifies the ruling set up in
O.D. 984, 5 Cum. BULL. 171 (1921), putting it in accord with the Hill decision.
13. Robert C. Coffey, 21 B.T.A. 1242 (1931), acquiescence, X-2 CUI. BULL.
14 (1931); Cecil M. Jack, 13 B.T.A. 726 (1928), acquiescence, VIII-2 Cum. BuLL.
26 (1929); J. Bentley Squier, 13 B.T.A. 1223 (1928), acquiescence, VIII-2 Cum.
BULL. 49 (1929); Alexander Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927), acquiescence, VI-2
Cum. BULL. 6 (1927); Marion D. Shutter, 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925), acquiescence, IV-2
Cum. BULL. 4 (1925). See I.T. 3448, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 206; G.C.M. 11654,
XII-1 Cum. BULL. 250 (1933); I.T. 2688, XII-1 CUM. BULL. 251 (1933); I.T.
2602, X-2 Cum. BULL. 130 (1931); I.T. 1520 1-2 CUM. BULL. 145 (1922); I.T.
1369, 1-1 Cum. BULL 123 (1922).
14. O.D. 785, 4 Cum. BULL. 130 (1921).

Irving L. Shein, 11 CCH TC MEm.

(1952).
15. Victor J. McQuade, 4 B.T.A. 837 (1926).
16. E. E. Dickinson, 8 B.T.A. 722 (1927).
17. Clyde A. Armstrong, 16 P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEC. 147,245 (1947).
18. The type of courses which the taxpayer attended in the Hill case, supra,
(English and psychology), although required for renewal of her license, were of
such a nature that they would be intellectually broadening. Tax courses lack this
quality and, therefore, are of a less personal nature.

DEC. 191
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too temporary in character to be considered a capital asset. The cost of
acquiring education in other fields, though in no way personal, might be
considered a capital expenditure because of the more permanent nature
of the knowledge acquired. 9 For example, an attorney with an established practice in the commercial law field might find it necessary to take
a course in the new Uniform Commercial Code if it is made law in his
state. Such a course may meet all the requirements of a business expense
and yet be considered a capital outlay because of its permanency. But
in spite of this possible line of distinction, the instant case most definitely
points in the direction of more frequent allowance of deductions for the
cost of education.

Internal RevenueTACKING OF PRIOR SERVICES RENDERED
BY ANOTHER IN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
DISALLOWED UNDER SECTION 107(a)
Plaintiff collaborated for thirteen months with another attorney,
Thomas C. McConnell, in the appellate proceedings of a lawsuit on which
McConnell previously had worked alone for forty months. They were not
common law partners, but it was agreed when plaintiff entered the case
that each should share in the contingent fee, if the lawsuit terminated
favorably. Upon successful completion of the case in 1946, plaintiff received $20,000, and in computing his income tax for that year availed himself of § 107(a) 1 to allocate this amount over the preceding fifty-three
months, during which McConnell had worked on the case. The district
court held that plaintiff had been a participant in a joint venture 2 and was
entitled to apply § 107(a) to his fee.3 The circuit court reversed on
appeal, holding that plaintiff could not tack the first forty months of service
by McConnell to the subsequent period of their joint performance because
McConnell had rendered the prior services in an individual capacity, and
not as a member of a partnership or joint venture. Van Hook v. United
States, 204 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 22 U.S.L. WEEK 3091
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1953).
19. "Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good will of an
old partnership." Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
1. "If at least 80 per centum of the total compensation for personal services
covering a period of thirty-six calendar months or more (from the beginning to
the completion of such services) is received or accrued in one taxable year by an
individual or a partnership, the tax attributable to any part thereof which is included
in the gross income of any individual shall not be greater than the aggregate of the
taxes attributable to such part had it been included in the gross income of such
individual ratably over that part of the period which precedes the date of such receipt or accrual." INT. Rev. CODE § 107(a).
2. "The term 'partnership' includes a

.

.

. joint venture ...

CODE § 3797(a) (2).
3. Van Hook v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1952).

"

INT. Rev.
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The purpose of § 107(a) is to afford relief to the taxpayer who receives in one year the bulk of his compensation for personal services covering a period of 36 calendar months or more, and would otherwise be subjected to the full burden of the graduated surtax.4 No change is made in
the tax liability for the prior years included in the period of service, but
the tax due in the year of receipt of the payment is limited to the total
additional tax which would have been levied in those prior years, had this
income been included in the income of the taxpayer ratably over the period
of service. As enacted originally, § 107(a) required that the services in
question be rendered personally by the taxpayer who invoked the provision.5 This condition was eliminated by amendment in 1942 for members of partnerships sharing in compensation received by the firm for longterm services performed by other members. 6 There was, however, no
indication that a taxpayer could claim relief with respect to compensation
received from his partnership for personal services rendered by it before he
became a partner. 7 Nevertheless, in Elder W. Marshall8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit permitted the taxpayerattorney to allocate over the entire period from 1935 to December, 1941
his share of a fee received by his partnership for services rendered by other
partners over those years, despite the fact that the taxpayer had not been
admitted to partnership until January, 1941. 9 As a result, application of
§ 107(a) bestowed an extra benefit upon the taxpayer, who would not
actually have sustained any loss by reason of the lump sum mode of payment. On the contrary, had portions of the fee been received annually by
4. SEN. REP. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1939) (Prior to amendment in
1942, the required period was five calendar years, infra note 5). See Note,. 65 HARv.
L. REv. 1193, 1196 (1952) for a comprehensive discussion of the problems arising
in the interpretation of this section.
5. "In the case of compensation (a) received, for personal services rendered by
an individual in his individual capacity, or as a member of a partnership, and covering
a period of five calendar years or more from the beginning to the completion of
such services, (b) paid (or not less than 95 per centum of which is paid) only on
completion of such services, and (c) required to be included in gross income of
such individual for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1938, the tax
attributable to such compensation shall not be greater than the aggregate of the
taxes attributable to such compensation had it been received in equal portions in each
of the years included in such period." Revenue Act of 1939, §220, 53 STAT. 878.
Ralph G. Lindstrom, 3 T.C. 686 (1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1945).
6. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1942).
there is
7. The circuit court in the instant case said of this amendment "...
nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress abandoned the 'burden'
theory which was the motive for enacting the original legislation." Instant case
at 27. But see 101 U. or PA. L. Rav. 1240, 1243 (1953).
8. 14 T.C. 90, aff'd, 185 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1950). Decided on its authority
were two analogous cases, Burnham Enersen, 9 CCH (1950) TC MEss. DEc. 42,
and Sigvald Nielson, 9 CCH (1950) TC MEm. DEC. 57, both aff'd, 187 F.2d 233
(9th Cir. 1951).
9. He became associated with the firm as an employee in 1938, but was given
no share in the profits until 1941. In Burnham Enersen and Sigvald Nielson, both
supra note 8, there was an interim period before admission to full partnership during
which the attorneys were paid a small percentage of the profits in addition to their
guaranteed salary. However, both cases were decided solely on the authority of
Elder W. Marshall, supra note 8, with no mention of this interim period.
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the partnership between 1935 and the end of 1941, the attorney would have
participated in only a fraction of the total fee, since he was on a profitsharing basis only from January to December, 1941.10 It is true that
granting of tax relief might be justifiable where the incoming partner could
prove that the terms of his contract with a previous firm resulted in loss of
right to share in fees for long term services rendered by that firm during
his membership but collected after his retirement. However, this situation
has not arisen in the cases interpreting § 107(a), and could arise only
rarely, since uncollected fees normally are included among the assets of
the partnership in which a retiring partner is entitled to share.".
The instant case limits extension of the Marshall case, which it expressly reaffirmed, by distinguishing it on the grounds that the instant
plaintiff's co-worker, McConnell, performed the first forty months of
service in a purely individual capacity, and hot as a member of a partnership or joint venture. Practical considerations do present some justification for a distinction, since a single-purpose joint venture by two individuals in any of the various personal service fields would lend itself far
more readily than the more stable framework of continuing partnerships
to illegitimate arrangements whereby an apparently bona fide cooperative
venture could be set up on paper in the late stages of a transaction, though
there never was any substantial cooperation in fact. However, in terms
of the requirements of § 107(a), the two cases are not distinguishable.
Both fall within the letter of the relief provision, but not within its spirit,
since in neither case did plaintiff, during the earlier part of the period over
which he sought to prorate his earnings, have any profit-sharing connection with the entity performing the services. A proper test would limit
prorating to the length of time taxpayer had held his profit-sharing status,
provided that he had enjoyed that status for at least 36 months during the
period of the rendering of the services. 12 When, as in Elder W. Marshall
10. Nevertheless, the Marshall court rejected the commissioner's argument that

the intent of Congress required reading into the express words of the section a
requirement that a partner reporting under § 107(a) have held such status for at
least 36 months prior to receipt of the compensation by his firm, and that he be allowed to allocate his share over no longer a period than the length of time he had
been a partner. Brief for Commissioner, pp. 26-27, 13-17, Elder W. Marshall, 14
T.C. 90, aff'd, 185 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1950).
11. LITTLE, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS 260, 261 (1952).
12. Strict adherence to the statutory purpose seems to demand that the entire
36 month period of profit-sharing upon which a taxpayer bases his claim to the
benefit of § 107(a) be required to coincide with a portion of the time during which
the services actually were rendered by his associates. Only by meeting this test
can the taxpayer demonstrate a tax burden analogous to that of an individual who
would have received income periodically over at least 36 months, had it not been
for the peculiar manner in which he was compensated. However, the American Law
Institute, While advocating reversal of the Marshall rule, would require as a minimum
only that the taxpayer have been a profit-sharer for 36 months prior to receipt of the
compensation by the entity which rendered the services. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
FEDERAL INcOmE TAx STATUTE, § X310(a) (3) (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 24,
1951). The argument of the commissioner in Elder W. Marshall, supra note 10, was
phrased in like terms, but further refinement was not necessary in that case, since
the partner had not even met the requirement of partnership for 36 months prior
to receipt of the fee. The vice in the test proposed by the American Law Institute
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and the instant case, the taxpayer would not have received any share of a
number of periodic payments and, as a result, is placed at no disadvantage
taxwise because of lump sum compensation, then § 107(a) should be
deemed inapplicable.
Limiting Elder W. Marshall involves reaffirmation of a case to which
the instant case is essentially contrary in reasoning. The desideratum is
clarification by Congress of the section's language so as to exclude from
its terms these cases which are inconsistent with its purpose.
is illustrated by the following hypothetical case. A firm renders services from
1/1/47 to 1/1/50; taxpayer becomes a partner on 12/1/49; payment is delayed until
after 12/1/52. Is § 107(a) to be available to this taxpayer who was a partner for 36
months prior to receipt of the compensation by his firm due to the chance circumstance that the client was tardy in making payment?

